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ELLIOTT V. GOOGLE, INC 860 F.3d 1151 (9TH
CIR. 201)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Elliott v. Google, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Google
trademark has fallen prey to genericide.2 Under the Lanham Act, a
trademark loses its registration if the mark becomes a generic name
for the goods or services for which it is registered.3 David Elliott
and Chris Gillespie ("Elliott plaintiffs") alleged that the Google
trademark had become generic based on public use.4 Specifically,
the Elliott plaintiffs argued that the public was not using the Google
trademark to describe internet searches done via the Google search
engine but instead to describe the general act of internet searching.5
To help support this argument, Elliott pointed to common phrases
such as, "I googled it."
In deciding the case, the District Court focused on internet
search engines instead of the act of searching the internet.7 By
doing so, the District Court found that the Google trademark had not
become generic because it was being used as a verb, which does not
automatically constitute generic use.' The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's holding and explained that trademarks become
generic when the public starts to use the mark to refer to the good
or service, not the act of using the good or service.9 The court held
that use of a mark as a verb does not render the trademark generic.' 0
Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017).
2 Id.; see infra note 44.
15 U.S.C. § 1064.
4 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1175 (D. Ariz. 2014).
8 Id.
9 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1157.
10 Id. at 1163.
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II. BACKGROUND
In February and March of 2012, Elliott acquired 763 domain
names that all included the word "google" from a domain name
registrar, Godaddy.com, LLC." The domain names paired the word
"google" with a variety of other terms. 12 After Google, Inc.
("Google") discovered Elliott's domain names, it filed a complaint
with the National Arbitration Forum, an organization that arbitrates
and mediates disputes for businesses. 13 Through its complaint,
Google claimed that the registered domain names violated the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policyl 4 , which is
included in the registrar's terms of use. 15 Google argued that
Elliott's registration violation is trademark infringement because the
domain names are confusingly similar to the trademark GOOGLE.16
The trademarks in question are No. 288450217 and No. 2806075,
i Id. at 1154; Google Inc. v. Chris Gillespie, 2012 WL 3679676, 7* (May 10,
2012).
12 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1154.
13 Id.
14 Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, General Information,
ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en.
Under the policy, most types of trademark-based domain-name
disputes must be resolved by agreement, court action, or
arbitration before a registrar will cancel, suspend, or transfer a
domain name.
15 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1154.
16 Id.
1 Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1159.
The [2884]502 Mark covers computer hardware; computer
software for creating indexes of information, indexes of web
sites and indexes of other information resources.
18 Id.
The [2806]075 Mark covers, inter alia: Computer services,
namely, providing software interfaces available over a network
in order to create a personalized on-line information service;
extraction and retrieval of information and data mining by
means of global computer networks; creating indexes of
information, indexes of web sites and indexes of other
72
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which collectively refer to the search engine. 19 The National
Arbitration Forum ruled in favor of Google and, on May 10, 2012,
transferred the domain names at issue to Google.2 0
In response to the National Arbitration Forum's decision,
Elliott filed an action in the Arizona District Court, which Gillespie
later joined.2 1 Elliott sought for the cancellation of the Google
trademark based on the theory that the trademark has become
generic. 2 2 In an attempt to justify his theory, Elliott argued the word
"google" is largely used as a "generic term universally used to
describe the act of internet searching." 23 On September 23, 2013,
both parties filed for summary judgment on whether the Google
trademark had become generic.2 1 In plaintiff s motion for summary
judgment, Elliott argued that the majority of the relevant public uses
the word "google" as a verb.25 Elliott further argued that verb use
constitutes generic use as a matter of law.26 Google argued that verb
use does not automatically amount to generic use. 27 Further,
Google asserted that Elliott failed in creating a triable issue of fact
as to the genericity of the Google trademark.28 The District Court
granted Google's motion for summary judgment.29
Elliott appealed the Arizona District Court's decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.30 On appeal, Elliott argued the
information sources in connection with global computer
networks; providing information from searchable indexes and
databases of information, including text, electronic documents,
databases, graphics and audio visual information, by means of
global computer information networks.
19 Id.
20 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1154.
21 Id. at 1154-55.
2 2 Id. at 1155.
23 Id.
24 Id
25 Id
26 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30Id.
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District Court erred in applying the primary significance test and
assessing the importance of verb use.31 Additionally, he argued that
the District Court impermissibly weighed the evidence when it ruled
on Google's summary judgment.32 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the
District Court's holding de novo, rejected Elliott's contentions, and
affirmed the summary judgment for Google. 33 In affirming the
District Court's decision, the appellate court held that verb use does
not automatically constitute genericide, which cancels a valid
trademark. 34 Elliott filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on August
14, 2017, asking the United States Supreme Court to overturn the
Ninth Circuit's decision.3 5 On October 16, 2017, the Supreme
Court denied Elliott's petition for writ of certiorari.36
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Elliott raised two issues on appeal. First, that the district
court misapplied the primary significance test and failed in
recognized the weight of verb usage. Second, that the district court
impermissibly weighed the evidence in granting Google's motion
for summary judgment. 37 The Ninth Circuit rejected both
arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. 38
To assess the district court's decision, the court here
explained the categories in which a potential trademark can be
classified: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4)
arbitrary or fanciful terms.39 Arbitrary marks are terms that have
meaning separate from the trademarked good or service.40 Fanciful
marks are terms are created by the trademark owner specifically for
31 id.
32 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155.
33 Id.
34 Id at 1163.
35 Elliott et al. v. Google Inc., No. 17-258, petition for cert. filed, 2017 WL
3601395 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017).
36 Elliott, David, et al. v. Google, Inc. 2017 WL 3581929 (Oct. 16, 2017).
37 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155.
3 8 id.
3 9 id.
40 1-2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.04.
74
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the trademarked good or service.4 Whereas generic marks are not
offered trademark protection, arbitrary or fanciful terms are
automatically afforded protection.42
Elliott argued that the Google trademark, which is in the
arbitrary category of protection, has shifted to the generic category
because of public appropriation of the mark.43 This is referred to as
genericide. 4 Genericide occurs when the public uses a trademark
in place of the generic name for particular types of goods or services
irrespective of its source. The court explained that the question of
whether a trademark has crossed the line into genericide is
determined by a "who-are-you/what-are-you" test.45
In looking to Elliott's first argument, the court named two
reasons for rejection. First, Elliott failed to recognize that
genericide claims must relate to a particular type of good or service.
Second, Elliott wrongly assumed verb use automatically equates to
41 Id.
42 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 1156.
For example, ASPIRIN, CELLOPHANE, and ESCALATOR
were once protectable as arbitrary or fanciful marks because
they were primarily understood as identifying the source of
certain goods. But the public appropriated those marks and now
primarily understands aspirin, cellophane, and escalator as
generic names for those same goods.
45 id.
If the relevant public primarily understands a mark as
describing "who" a particular good or service is, or where it
comes from, then the mark is still valid. But if the relevant
public primarily understands a mark as describing "what" the
particular good or service is, then the mark has become generic.
In sum, we ask whether "the primary significance of the term
in the minds of the consuming public is [now] the product [and
not] the producer."
(quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83
L. Ed. 73, 1939 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 850 (1938)).
2017] 75
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generic use. 46 The court noted that the plain language of the
Lanham Act clearly requires the claim of genericide be in
connection with the goods or services for which it is registered.4 7
The court went on to explain the importance of that particular
requirement when assessing arbitrary marks.48
Arbitrary marks connect an unrelated, existing word to a
good or service. 9 It would be illogical to cancel an arbitrary
trademark like "Apple" for computers because it is generic when
used in connection to fruit.5 0 The mere fact that arbitrary marks are
afforded federal trademark protection is evidence that genericide
claims are required to be in connection with the good or service for
which the -trademark is registered.5 '
The court's second line of reasoning in rejecting Elliott's
argument was that verb use does not automatically constitute
generic use.5 2 The basis of Elliott's argument was that a word can
only be used in a trademark sense when used as an adjective because
both trademarks and adjectives are descriptive.53 The court referred
to the Congressional Record to show how the primary significance
test applies to claims of genericide. 54 Further, the court has
previously implicitly rejected the argument that adjective use only
46 Id. at 1157.
47 Id.
48 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1157.
49Id.
so Id.
5i Id.
52 Id.
s3 Id.
54 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1157-58.
A trademark can serve a dual function-that of [naming] a
product while at the same time indicating its source.
Admittedly, if a product is unique, it is more likely that the
trademark adopted and used to identify that product will be
* used as if it were the identifying name of that product. But this
is not conclusive of whether the mark is generic.
S. Rep. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984).
76
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represents trademark use.5 " Additionally, in evaluating Elliott's
examples of the public using the Google trademark as a verb, the
district court coined the terms "discriminative verb" and
"indiscriminative verb."56
The Ninth Circuit rejected Elliott's second argument that the
District Court impermissibly weighed evidence when it granted
Google's summary judgment. 57 Elliott pointed to the "sheer
quantity" of evidence to support this argument.s The court found
the evidence to be largely irrelevant to the primary significance test
because the genericide claim did not relate to a good or service.5 9
All of the admissible evidence submitted by Elliott are examples
only of verb use.6 0 Elliott provided clear examples of indiscriminate
verb use by the media and by consumers, but the district court
properly excluded them because they were not disclosed during the
discovery period.6 1 The court noted that even if the above evidence
was included, that it was largely irrelevant.62 The court repeatedly
pointed out that claims of genericide must be in connection to the
good or service for which the mark is registered.6 3
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The existence of this case incites the question of why brands
fight so hard against becoming generic. Trademarks are the "single
" Id. at 1158 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1982)).
56 Id.; Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2014) ("A
mark can be used as a verb in a discriminate sense so as to refer to an activity
with a particular product or service... . However, a mark can also be used as a
verb in an indiscriminate sense so as to refer to a category of activity in
general.").
5 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1159.
5 8 Id.
59 Id. at 1157.60 Id. at 1161.
61 id
62 Id.
63 Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158-59.
2017] 77
7
Jewell: Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2017
DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP L4 W [Vol. XXVIII: 71
largest source of intangible value in a company."' In 2014, Forbes
estimated the Google trademark's value at $113,000,000,000.65
Google still controls the Google trademark, so it can
continue to prevent competitors and third party developers, like
Elliott, from tarnishing the mark.6 6 The holding in the present case
brings good news to owners of popular trademarks that are being
used as verbs more and more often. For example, some popular
trademarked social media networks like Snapchat and Instagram are
being used as verbs. 67 The District Court used Photoshop" to help
further explain discriminative and indiscriminative verb use.
There is no way to know if a person is using the verb in a
discriminative or indiscriminative sense, which would be using the
verb to refer to the act of using the registered trademark or to refer
to the act of using similar products to that of the registered
trademark. 70 By explaining that verb use does not constitute generic
use, the Ninth Circuit has helped these increasingly successful
companies hold on to their trademark registrations.
The holding in Elliott v. Google, Inc. could create new
advertising possibilities for companies. Traditionally, trademark
owners discourage the use of their mark as a noun or verb to avoid
genericide. 7 1 However, in light of the holding in the present case,
64 Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011,
11:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-
most-valuable-trademarks/#944031236b81.
65 Eric Goldman, Google Successfully Defends Its Most Valuable Asset In Court,
FORBES (Sept. 15, 2014, 12:11 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/15/google-successfully-
defends-its-most-valuable-asset-in-court/.
66 Id.
67 Users of these social media platforms will sometimes refer the action of
posting on the platform by using the name of the platform as a verb. Examples
of this include: "I Snapchatted it" and "Did you Instagram it?".
68 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2014).
69 Id.
70 1Id.
n Danica Mathes, Lessons From Google Surviving The Genericide Attack,
LAw360 (July 7, 2017, 11:48 AM),
78
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some companies might try to strengthen their brand by using the
trademark as verb is advertising slogans. Prior to this case, a few
companies have promoted their brand with verb usage, 72 such as
Yahoo!'s "Do You Yahoo!?" marketing campaign.
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Elliott asserted the
Ninth Circuit's decision has created a Circuit Split.73 Elliott argued
that the primary significance test prior to the present case had been
interpreted as the rule of "majority usage" instead of "majority
understanding." 74 Elliott further claimed the Ninth Circuit rejected
this long-standing test in favor of an assessment of how the public
understands a word. The Second Circuit has interpreted the rule
of primary significance to mean "majority usage." 76 If his assertion
is accurate, this could lead other major companies looking to protect
their trademark to find security in the Ninth Circuit. This could also
potentially offer more protection to trademark owners located
within the Ninth Circuit as opposed to other Circuits. Due to the
circuits' differing tests, the U.S. Supreme Court should have
considered the case to give clarity as to what test should be applied
to genericide claims.
V. CONCLUSION
This holding demonstrates effects common vernacular and
the evolution of language can have on trademark law and how it is
applied. The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that a trademark cannot
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/938665/lessons-from-google-surviving-the-
genericide-attack.
72 Id.
7 Elliott v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 3601395, *12-*13 (Aug. 14, 2017) (citing
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581, 138
U.S.P.Q. 349 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Since the great majority of those members of the
public who use the word 'thermos' are not aware of any trademark significance,
there is not enough dual use to support King-Seeley's claims to monopoly of the
word as a trademark.")).
74 Elliott v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 3601395, *12 (Aug. 14, 2017).
7 Id. at *13.
76 King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d
Cir. 1963).
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become generic from widespread use as a verb.n Therefore, the
Arizona District Court did not err in assessing the validity of the
Google trademark, meaning Google has successfully protected its
most valuable asset. 78 Elliott is good news for successful
companies, especially highly successful companies like Google.
Kayla Jewell*
n"Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1163.
78 Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2019, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2014, Florida
State University. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Volini for his
critiques as my legal writing professor, as well as all of the editors for their
guidance and hard work.
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